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31. Introduction
Modern economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. Although they
have a common theme, their relationship still swings between pure co-existence and selective
interaction. Starting from the analysis of human behaviour on markets, modern economics has
developed a behavioural model which disregards psychological factors almost completely.
The „homo oeconomicus“ takes decisions in a rational and emotionless manner. He or she
compares the expected costs and utilities of the different alternatives at hand, and finally
selects the one that benefits him or her the most. Decisions are assumed to have a high degree
of rationality (cognitive limitations resulting in systematically suboptimal decisions are
disregarded); they are based on unlimited willpower (self control problems and emotions do
not play a role); and actions are solely guided by self–interest (the homo oeconomicus does
not have pro-social preferences, i.e. the utility of other individuals does not enter into his
decision calculus). Homo oeconomicus, however, reacts to changes in his possibility space in
a systematic and therefore predictable way: when the relative price (or the opportunity cost)
of a good or an activity increases, the demand for the respective good will fall, and the
respective activity will be carried out less („law of demand“). This economic approach to
human behaviour has been successfully applied to areas outside of the economy. Often
termed „economic imperialism“, the economic approach has produced fruitful insights in such
areas as politics („Public Choice“), law („Law and Economics“), history („New Economic
History“), the arts („Cultural Economics“), or family („Economics of the Family“).
Economics has not always been so distant from psychology, however, as the concept of the
homo oeconomicus suggests. In the beginnings of economics, economists like Smith,
Bentham, Edgeworth, Marshall and many others were aware of, and even analysed, the
psychological foundations of preferences and beliefs, and acknowledged them as important
determinants of human behaviour. Psychological considerations in economics were lost when
neoclassical economics started its triumphant progress within the field of economics
throughout the 20th century. In the second section of this article, we briefly describe this
historical process. Then we give a detailed account of the concept of homo oeconomicus,
show the strengths of this approach in explaining (market) behaviour, and argue that the
approach offers important insights for psychology and other social sciences.
4In the last two decades, the neoclassical assumptions underlying the concept of homo
oeconomicus have been increasingly criticised. In many cases, empirical studies produced
results conflicting with economic predictions. This has led to the development of a
„Behavioural Economics“, which has successfully adapted the economic approach by
incorporating psychological aspects into the model of human behaviour. At the same time, the
usefulness of the traditional economic model to understand the workings of the economy has
been reconsidered, and its implications for practical economic policy have been revised. We
demonstrate this new relationship between psychology and economics for three major areas.
Section three is concerned with the limitations of the traditional economic approach resulting
from the bounded rationality of individuals. Numerous anomalies have been identified,
indicating that behaviour can systematically deviate from a fully rational model of decision
making. We discuss the often divergent ways by which these anomalies have been
incorporated into economic theory. Section four deals with the limitations of the economic
approach resulting from bounded self-interest. Individuals have been found to behave in a
non-selfish way in many situations, which has implications for economic theory in three
respects. First, experimental economics has shown that pro-social preferences play a major
role in human behaviour: individuals often follow social norms, like fairness or reciprocity.
Second, the economic approach does not take sufficiently into account that individuals do
many things out of intrinsic motivation, or because it corresponds to their self-image
(identity). Third, non-selfish behaviour is crucial when market failure occurs and certain
public goods are not, or only insufficiently, produced. Many areas of public and economic life
are characterised by social dilemma situations, and non-selfish behaviour is a necessary
precondition to overcome them (given that they cannot be regulated by the state). Section five
treats the limitations of the economic approach resulting from its bounded utility concept.
Neoclassial economics has constructed a utility concept completely deprived of any hedonic
content. Utility can only be observed and assessed indirectly by looking at the revealed
behaviour of individuals. In contrast, psychology treats utility as directly observable: utility
can be assessed using measures of reported subjective well-being (or happiness), which are
regularly assessed in surveys. By using happiness as an alternative measure of welfare, and
studying its economic and institutional determinants, new insights about the impact of
economic and political choices on human welfare can be gained.
52. Imperialistic Economics Drives Out Psychology
Economics is considered to be “the Queen of the Social Sciences” by its proponents and to be
“an Imperialistic Science” by its critics. Both characterisations of economics are due to the
development toward a fully rational model of economic decision-making, which represents
the core of the generally accepted and rigorous neoclassical economics. The analytical
strengths of the neoclassical assumptions have made it possible to apply the economic
approach not only to questions traditionally within the scope of economics (market
behaviour), but also to many non-market situations traditionally studied in psychology. Both
aspects of this imperialistic programme are illustrated in this section. After an outline of the
historical development of economic theory, the economic approach to human behaviour is
presented in detail. We discuss its strengths and successes, and its importance for psychology
and other social sciences.
2.1 The Loss of Psychology in Economics
Within today’s mainstream economics, the relationship between economics and psychology
can best be described as imperialistic on the part of economics. In the course of developing
neoclassical economic theory, the psychological content (which still existed in the work of
economic precursors) was totally squeezed out. A lot of classical economists (those living in
the 18th and 19th century) carefully considered psychological reasoning when debating about
preferences and beliefs. Several developments in the economic science after 1930 have led to
a loss of psychological content (Lewin 1996). This can best be shown with the concept of
utility. Using the concept of utility as an illustration is also useful because the assumption that
individuals maximise expected utility is at the core of neoclassical theory.
The Utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1948), had very broad views on utility and
were convinced that utility could be measured. Their extensive reflections on human utility
started from the view that human experiences had a hedonic quality. Bentham, for example,
distinguished no less than fourteen different components of utility. His “pleasures” and
“pains” contained many hedonic experiences resulting from tangible, but also intangible
goods, such as „pleasure of sense, wealth, skill, amity, a good name, power, piety,
benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, relief and the pleasures
dependent on association“ (Bentham 1789/1996, S. 34-35). Edgeworth (1881) even wanted to
measure utility using a „hedonometer“, assuming that utility had a cardinal quality.
6The 1930s witnessed a revolutionary change in the concept of utility. Robbins (1932)
questioned the existence of a cardinally measurable utility function based on subjective
experiences, and therewith declared a direct assessment of utility to be impossible. An ordinal
concept of utility gained ground. It states that utility can only be indirectly inferred from
actual choices made. Utility is only reflected in the “revealed behaviour” of individuals. One
can also speak of “decision utility” in the sense of an ordinal preference index indicating
whether good A is preferred over good B, or whether the opposite holds, or whether
individuals are indifferent. Utility thus just becomes a number without any further substantive
meaning whatsoever, and it only serves to explain the choices made by individuals between
various goods. After World War II, these views have become enshrined in myriads of
theoretical treatises and textbooks as the mainstream “New Welfare Economics”. The switch
from the idea of measurable cardinal utility to a preference index of ordinal utility –
graphically represented by the consumer indifference curves – was successful in economics
for two good reasons. First, states of minds, such as how much satisfaction or pleasure a good
yields, are indeed inherently difficult to measure. Economists endeavouring a scientific
approach to their discipline are therefore still deeply sceptical about the possibility of being
able to measure utility. Second, cardinal utility is not necessary for economic theory. As
Hicks (1934) and Allen (1934) have shown, demand theory can be entirely grounded in
ordinal utility in the form of a preference index. Samuelson (1938) then formulated the
general behavioural foundations of the still widely accepted standard theory. It attributes
utility solely to actual choices. Revealed behaviour is the only way to find out something
about individuals’ utility. This also means that no empirical knowledge of persons’ emotional
states or opinions about their utility is needed to explain the choices individuals make
between goods on markets.
For utility to be properly reflected in actual choices, individuals have to meet some important
requirements when making their decisions: they have to be well (or even perfectly) informed
about the alternatives; they have to build correct expectations about the consequences of their
choices; and they have to pursue their wishes – and only their own wishes – in a logically
consistent way. These assumptions are at the core of neoclassical economics and reflected in
other theoretical cornerstones of economics: the theory of expected utility maximisation
(based on the von-Neumann/Morgenstern axioms, see e.g. Schoemaker, 1982; Machina,
1987), the theory of rational expectations (Muth, 1961; Lucas und Prescott, 1971), or game
theory (e.g. Gibbons, 1992). These theories have been cleared of any psychological content in
a similar way to that illustrated for the concept of utility. The “homo oeconomicus”, which is
7at the centre of the next subsection, is built around these behavioural assumptions of rational
and selfish behaviour.
2.2 The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (homo oeconomicus)
The homo oeconomicus stands for a behavioural model which is grounded in the analysis of
human behaviour on markets. Understood as a general social science paradigm, however, it is
in principle applicable to all areas of human behaviour (see Becker, 1976,1996; Becker und
Murphy, 2000; Frey, 1999). Human action can be analysed with the help of five elements:
Individuals Act. What happens on the social level is explained by the behaviour of persons
(methodological individualism). This does not mean at all that human beings are considered
isolated; rather, their behaviour can only be understood as the result of interactions with their
surroundings, other people and institutions.
This approach differs fundamentally from theories in which collectivities act on their own, as
is assumed, for example, in the organic conception of the state. No further distinctions are
made below the level of the individual. This distinguishes the economic approach from
several variants of psychology where split personalities are studied, and also from
sociobiology where there is a level of genes below the individual person.
To take the individualistic stand also means that a person's evaluations and normative views
are accepted. Statements such as "something is socially desirable" are taken to be meaningless
because "society" is no behavioural unit which could proffer an evaluation. What counts is
how people in society evaluate the various possibilities open to them.
Incentives Determine Behaviour. People do not act randomly but react systematically and
predictably to incentives. Incentives signal which possibilities for action are more
advantageous or more disadvantageous. Individuals compare the advantages and dis-
advantages of the possibilities of action available to them in an implicit and sometimes
explicit way. They thereby also form expectations about the future. Homo oeconomicus needs
not to be fully informed, but he will seek and find solutions, learn and invent, and extend his
limited knowledge if found worthwhile.
8Incentives are Produced by Preferences and Constraints which are Strictly
Distinguished. Changes in human behaviour are attributed (as far as possible) to observable
and measurable changes of the opportunity set determined by the constraints. The most
important constraints individuals face are: (i) disposable income (including wealth and the
possibility to get credit); (ii) the relative prices for goods and services (in case goods are
traded on markets), or in a more general sense, the implicit prices of the different choice
alternatives (opportunity costs); and (iii) the time required for consuming and acting. The first
two conditions define a person's disposable real income, which is important for economic
analysis. The more general point is, however, that people’s possibilities for action are always
constrained, and therefore there is a constant necessity to trade off between different
alternatives. Moreover, constraints need not solely be monetary or of time, but can also
consist of physical or psychological limitations. This potentially opens the economic
approach for the incorporation of psychological effects, as will be shown in sections three to
five.
Individuals Pursue Their Own Interests and Generally Behave in a Selfish Way. This
assumption about preferences seems at first sight to represent a negative evaluation of man:
an egoist is not likeable. This is, however, a misunderstanding. Selfish behaviour means that
it cannot be assumed that every person acts magnanimously towards others—this would
certainly be unrealistic. Nor does it mean that every person always endeavours to harm others.
Selfish behaviour takes a middle position. Most people are, with few exceptions, neither
saints nor devils. Selfish behaviour can be relied on, especially when human interaction takes
place on anonymous markets. In the economic realm, it can generally be expected that people
act to their own advantage. Whether this assumption also holds for situations with smaller
social distance is discussed in section 4.
On the basis of these five elements of the economic model of human behaviour, it is possible
to derive a central law—the generalised law of demand. Suitably applied, it allows to theor-
etically and empirically explain how people act.
The law of demand states: if the price (or cost) of a good or activity rises in comparison to
other goods or activities (i.e., if the relative price rises) the particular good is demanded less
and the particular activity is carried out less.
9This central law is based on the principle of marginal substitution. A relative price rise does
not provoke a total or abrupt change in behaviour but rather a more or less strong adjustment
to changing scarcities. The law only applies provided other influences stay constant (this is
the ceteris paribus assumption). The influence of other factors on demand (especially of
changes in income) must be taken into account separately.
An important property of the law of demand is that the direction of the expected change in
behaviour is well determined. The relatively more expensive activity is undertaken to a lesser
extent, and the relatively more expensive good is purchased and consumed less, and vice
versa. This property does not normally obtain for other influences on demand. In particular,
no general theoretical hypotheses exist about whether higher income raises or lowers demand.
The demand for larger cars may increase with rising income, the demand for plain food may
decrease. Theoretically, however, the direction of the influence of a higher income is
uncertain; it can only be determined by empirical observation.
2.3. The Importance of the Economic Approach for Psychology (and Other
Social Sciences)
For psychology (and other social sciences), the significance of the economic approach to
human behaviour lies mainly in its coherence and universal validity and that this approach
offers clear predictions for behaviour. Psychology, in contrast, does not have a general model
of behaviour, but consists of a large number of partial theories and special effects, which are
more or less isolated from each other. The differences become clear when the economic
approach is compared to models of behaviour in social psychology, which are also based on
the hypotheses that individuals behave in such a way as to maximise their own utility (for
example Ajzen 1988, Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). According to these latter models, social
attitudes are the central determinants of behaviour. Attitudes are defined as a propensity to
judge an object as positive or negative. It is taken as being self evident that a tendency
towards positive judgement is followed by corresponding behaviour; that, for example,
citizens vote for politicians whom they value, and that they buy goods they think are good.
Economists do not expect that behaviour could be predicted on the basis of preferences, a
concept that is related to attitudes in psychology. Some economists (in particular Stigler and
Becker 1977) have even argued that changes in human behaviour can and should only be
explained by changes in restrictions. The reason is that it is difficult to empirically capture
and separate changes in preferences from the change in behaviour that has to be explained. In
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contrast, changes in constraints are observable and mostly exogenous. In particular, changes
in the prices of goods and services, which are central for economic analysis, are easy to
observe and to quantify. They are, moreover, independent from preference changes of single
individuals, and therefore empirically distinguishable from the latter.
This methodological strategy is not confined to market behaviour. The economic approach
treats ‘prices’ very extensively: the concept includes not only monetary prices (such as the
price of goods) or monetary burdens (such as taxes), but all costs which arise when under-
taking an action (opportunity costs). Changes in prices or opportunity costs can be identified
also in non-market settings when constraints are broadly understood as all forms of
institutions shaping and coordinating human behaviour (North 1990).
There are many examples for the successful application of this modern view of economics, in
particular areas of human life that are traditionally linked with psychology. Important
examples are the family: marriage, children, divorce, suicide (Becker 1971, 1981), including
the determinants of abortion (Medoff 1988); drug addiction (Winston 1980, Becker and
Murphy 1988); religious practices (Ehrenberg 1977, Iannacone 1991, 1998); criminal
behaviour (Becker 1968, Cameron 1988, Freeman 1999); and social segregation and norms
(Becker and Murphy 2000). Introductory surveys to this literature are given e.g. in Becker
(1976), Frey (1999) or Lazear (2000).
The economic approach is moreover important for psychology and other social sciences
because it takes a completely different view on the possibilities of influencing human
behaviour. The aim of scientific research should not only be to make sound positive analyses,
but it should also be able to offer advice on possible welfare improvements. Economics is
able to derive well defined policy implications from the general law of demand. The starting
point for inducing behavioural changes are the incentives. Prices for unwanted activities
should be raised in order to lower demand for such activities, and vice versa. In
environmental economics, for example, it is stipulated that a price should be put on the use of
the environment by introducing pollution taxes. Empirical observations show that such
policies are often effective. In contrast, psychology generally focuses on people’s preferences
when behaviour should be changed. Influencing people’s preferences, however, is normally
much more difficult than applying the price mechanism, and the direction of behavioural
change often remains unpredictable. For these reasons, it is in many instances easier to
achieve changes in behaviour by relying on the incentive instruments proposed by economic
theory than trying to change people’s attitudes and values.
11
2.4. The Return of Psychology
The application of the economic approach to other areas has also made the weaknesses of
homo oeconomicus more obvious. There are signs that the easy gains in insights achieved
when the paradigm was applied to new areas are diminishing (Hirshleifer 1985, Frey 2001).
The diminishing marginal returns of the "imperialist programmes" of economics suggest that
the time has come for a change in direction: in the future, the main emphasis should not lie in
exporting economics but rather in importing aspects and insights from other social sciences,
like psychology. What is needed is an effort to overcome the model of "homunculus
oeconomicus", who is at all times in full control of his or her emotions, who does not know
any cognitive limitations, who is not embedded in a personal network, who is only
extrinsically motivated and whose individual preferences are not distinguished from his or her
individual happiness. There is already a considerable amount of literature pointing the way
this future development may go, and there are a great number of ideas from psychology
which have been fruitfully introduced into economics (for other surveys see Earl 1990, Rabin
1998, 2002 or Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). Today’s behavioural economics not only
builds on the work of precursors like Simon (1978), Katona (1975), Leibenstein (1976), and
Scitovsky (1976), but also German speaking economists like Schmölders (1962) and Jöhr
(1972). Later, authors like Akerlof (1984), Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Frank (1985,
1988), and Thaler (1992) contributed important insights. In the next three sections, we shall
discuss several areas in which social psychology has proved to enlighten economics.
3. Limits of Homo Oeconomicus: Bounded Rationality
Homo oeconomicus is based on the theory of expected utility maximisation, which builds on
logically consistent and rational propositions on how humans make decisions (the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms). These propositions are generally seen as reasonable, and
therefore it was taken as plausible for quite some time that individuals behave accordingly.
Over the last two decades, however, a large literature has accumulated that shows both
experimentally and theoretically that the theory of expected utility maximisation can explain
only a limited part of observed behaviour. This is so because individuals face cognitive and
emotional constraints, which are discussed in this section three.
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3.1. Behavioural Anomalies
Evidence on behavioural anomalies was published early on in economics journals. The Allais
paradox (1953) or the anomalies found by Ellsberg (1961) on individuals’ treatment of small
probabilities were well known and fundamental, but were not taken seriously. It needed
further experiments by psychologists (see Tverksy and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982, Arkes and Hammond 1986, Dawes
1988) and by economists (see Schoemaker 1982, Hogarth and Reder 1987, Thaler 1992) for
behavioural anomalies to be recognised. These experiments revealed overwhelming evidence
that humans, as well as animals (McDonald, Kagel and Battalio 1991), do not act rationally in
the sense of following the von-Neumann/Morgenstern axioms. Violations of expected utility
maximisation were found to be not random but systematic. Important anomalies for
economics include (for more complete accounts see Starmer 2000, Rabin 1998, Frey and
Eichenberger 2001): sunk costs (people tend to take foregone costs into account in their
decisions, although they should only evaluate future costs and utilities); opportunity cost
effect (out-of-pocket monetary costs are given greater weight in the decision calculus than
opportunity costs of the same size); endowment effect (goods in a person’s endowment are
valued more highly than those not held in the endowment); and preference reversal (when
choosing between two lotteries, individuals once choose the first and once choose the second
lottery when the decision context is logically completely identical, but framed differently).
Moreover, anomalies well known in social psychology like availability bias, anchoring,
certainty effect, reference point effect and especially framing can be relevant for economic
contexts. All these anomalies show that expected utility maximisation theory does not
sufficiently describe individual behaviour under risk and uncertainty. It is thus an important
question what the consequences are for economic theory.
Orthodox economists often advance the argument that anomalies might be relevant at the
individual level, but that they are not of importance for aggregate markets. The more
complete and efficient a market is, so the standard counterargument, the more ‘irrational’
agents are driven from the market, and the less anomalies are observed. Individuals prone to
anomalies lose money, which allows rational agents to take over wealth and dominate the
overall market. Even if a substantial amount of individuals are prone to anomalies, market
forces provide strong monetary incentives for rational decisions. For market outcomes to be
efficient, moreover, it is sufficient if only some ‘marginal’ agents act rationally and exploit
arbitrage possibilities. Empirical tests of the hypothesis that markets are efficient are therefore
13
a crucial means for evaluating the relevance of psychological factors for economic theory. In
recent years, many such studies have been conducted for financial markets, because they
come the closest to the ideal of a perfect market. Two studies are summarised as an example
(based on Mullainathan and Thaler 2000; see Shleifer 2000 for a more detailed account of this
literature).
The study by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) is explicitly motivated by the psychological finding
that people overreact to new information and underweight more distant information when
taking decisions. Given that investors on stock markets behave accordingly, it can be
expected that stocks which had performed well over a period of time are overvalued.
Individuals who overreact to good news drive the prices of these stocks too high. Similarly,
stocks which had performed badly for some time might be undervalued. From this, DeBondt
and Thaler derive the hypothesis that past ‘winners’ should have lower future returns than the
average market, while past ‘losers’ should outperform the market. Using data from the New
York Stock Exchange, they are able to corroborate this hypothesis: the 35 stocks which had
performed the worst over the past five years yielded above-average returns over the next five
years, while the 35 biggest winners subsequently underperformed. Thus, bounded rationality
(in the sense of limited cognitive information processing abilities) plays a role in investor
decisions, and the anomaly is evident even at the aggregate market level.
Odean (1998) investigates whether investors are subject to loss aversion, i.e. whether they
weight losses more heavily than gains. This is the case, for example, if investors are more
reluctant to realise capital losses than to realise capital gains. Odean’s empirical study finds
exactly this behaviour: around 15% of all gains are realised by investors, but only 10 % of all
losses. This behaviour, however, comes at an economic cost and is surprising in so far that
investors face strong monetary incentives to make rational decisions.
A host of other studies has identified anomalies on financial markets. A recent overview of
the by now substantial literature is given by Shleifer (2000); see also the more popular book
by Shiller (2000).
3.2. Self-Control Problems
Individuals are also boundedly rational because they are often not able to stick to their long-
term goals, but succumb to the temptation of immediate gratification. Human beings have
limited will-power. An obvious example is smokers who want to quit in the interests of better
long-term health, but repeatedly fail to refrain from the immediate pleasure of smoking a
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cigarette. Such “self control problems” are also relevant for economic contexts. Banks,
Blundell und Tanner (1998), for example, show that people’s consumption expenditures fall
sharply when they retire and their incomes drop. This is against their long-term preferences,
because most people would like to maintain their standard of  living even after retirement. But
individuals simply seem unable to save enough for retirement. One reason for this is that
individuals’ short-term and long-term preferences often conflict with each other: saving more
money would be in their long term interests, but the “short-term selves” of people often
choose the immediate gratification of spending the money. As this behaviour violates
intertemporal utility maximisation, the phenomenon is also called “time-inconsistent
preferences” or “hyperbolic discounting” (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue und Rabin, 1999; for
a critical evaluation see Frederick et al. 2002). Self control problems have been identified for
a wide range of consumer decisions (Angeletos et al., 2001, Mullainathan and Gruber 2002).
However, the existence of self control problems does not mean that the rational choice
approach has to be completely relinquished. One of the defining characteristics of human
beings is that they are able to recognise their weaknesses and to overcome them (at least
partly). A much-discussed way to circumvent anomalies, or to reduce the cost incurred when
falling prey to them, is to establish rules of self-commitment. Probably more importantly,
individuals resort to social institutions in order to get help when struggling to overcome their
weaknesses (Frey and Eichenberger 2001). For example, individuals who know that they are
unable to resist the temptation of consuming more and faster than they wish, have an
incentive to support political actions forcing them to plan more for their future, e.g., by
introducing an obligatory old age pension scheme run by the state.
3.3. Emotions
Apart from cognitive limitations, human decisions can also be constrained by emotions. This
seems clear: everybody is aware of situations where strong emotions have precluded a
rational decision. Over the last few years, the role of emotions in human decision making has
been studied mainly by psychologists (for a survey see Loewenstein und Lerner, 2001). The
mostly experimental studies have identified numerous effects of emotions on behaviour.
Nevertheless, the relevance of emotions for a general model of (market) behaviour is not very
clear (Elster, 1999). First, there are hardly any empirical studies which try to isolate emotional
effects in economically relevant contexts. The investigations of self-control problems
illustrated in the previous subsection come closest. Second, in many situations it is difficult to
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distinguish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ influences of emotions. The view that all emotions are irrational
is not supported by current research (Loewenstein and Lerner, p.38). Whereas emotions may
lead to suboptimal decisions in some situations, the absence or deliberate oppression of
emotions can substantially harm the ability of individuals to make a decision at all (Damasio,
1994). Third, future investigation is needed to establish how much emotions change market
outcomes. If positive and negative emotions are distributed randomly across market
participants, for example, the (potential) behavioural effects tend to average out in the
aggregate.
4. Limits of Homo Oeconomicus: Bounded Self-interest
The economic approach starts from the assumption that people are selfish. It has been
repeatedly shown that in many situations, especially when individuals act on markets, this is a
powerful approximation to actual behaviour (Smith, 1962, Becker, 1976). Over the last ten
years, however, experimental economists and other social scientists have collected
unambiguous evidence that individuals are often boundedly selfish. This finding is important
for many economically relevant situations of exchange between individuals that do not
correspond to the traditional view of a perfectly functioning market. In this section, three
applications are discussed: (i) the role of pro-social preferences, like norms of fairness and
reciprocity, in shaping human behaviour and market outcomes; (ii) the role of intrinsic
motivation and identity for economics; and (iii) the role of non-selfish behaviour for
overcoming social dilemmas (i.e., when markets fail).
4.1. Pro-social Preferences
The assumption of rational self-interest has been tested intensively over the last few years.
Thereby, the introduction of experimental techniques into the economic science has played a
major role. Economic experiments are different from experiments undertaken by other social
scientists (like e.g. psychologists) mainly because individuals are paid according to their
behaviour in the experiment. This allows to derive game theoretic predictions about how a
homo oeconomicus would act in a given experiment. The predictions can then be compared to
actual behaviour.
There have been conducted a large number of experiments by now showing that individuals
often do not act like complete egoists (for surveys see Fehr und Gächter, 2000; Fehr und
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Schmidt, 2001). The observed behaviour can only be explained by other-regarding, pro-social
preferences: individuals follow social norms like fairness, reciprocity, or altruism. By fairness
it is meant that people want to achieve an equitable distribution of resources between the
parties involved in an exchange relationship. Reciprocity means that individuals reward kind
actions of others by acting kindly as well, and punish unkind actions by responding in a
hostile manner, even if this comes at a (monetary) cost. Both types of behaviour are not
compatible with homo oeconomicus, as well as a third type of pro-social preference often
observed which consists of unconditional, pure altruism (Andreoni 1989, Frey and Meier
2002).
The existence of pro-social preferences has hardly any consequences for aggregate outcomes
on markets if exchanges are perfectly contractible. On incomplete markets, however, they can
substantially alter market outcomes. An impressive example is given by Bewley (1999) who
conducted an extensive survey of American personnel managers during the recession of the
early 1990s. Asked why firms did not cut their workers’ pay (although that is what economics
would expect firms to do in a recession, because of the difficult market situation, and because
rising unemployment allows them to do so), personnel managers answered: pay cuts would be
perceived as unfair, and workers would react negatively to them by lowering their work
morale. This surprising result is based on the fact that labour contracts are incomplete:
because not all aspects of a job can be contracted upon ex ante, workers are given some
discretion. Obviously, when workers decide to use their discretion in the interests of the firm
(high work morale) or not (low work morale), preferences for fairness seem to play a major
role. High work morale thus can be maintained by not cutting pay. But these fairness
considerations also come at an economic cost. Because they lead to downward wage rigidities
(which have been observed for many industrialized countries), workers are rather laid off than
average wages of the workforce lowered. This causes higher unemployment than would be
observed on a perfectly functioning labour market. Pro-social preferences are also of some
importance for consumer decisions. As has been shown in surveys for the US (Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, 1986) and for Europe (Frey, 1990), consumers judge the prices set by
companies mainly by the fairness of these prices.
4.2. Intrinsic Motivation and Identity
Economic analysis is based on the idea that individuals respond systematically to changes in
relative prices. The incentives set from outside motivate people to act in a predictable way.
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This view disregards that there are other motivating forces, like intrinsic motivation or the
individuals’ self-image (identity). They can systematically affect market outcomes or the
effectiveness of incentive instruments, as will be shown in this subsection.
Psychologists generally distinguish between two kinds of motivation: extrinsic motivation,
induced by manipulations of rewards or sanctions from the outside (the economist's relative
prices), and intrinsic motivation, where people perform an activity for its own sake because of
reasons lying within their own person (DeCharms 1968, Deci 1971). Intrinsically motivated
behaviour is relevant in many areas of economic and political life; examples are work morale,
voluntary compliance with social norms, civic virtue, or tax morale. For economic theory,
intrinsic motivation is of special importance because it cannot be simply treated as a constant.
There is a systematic dynamic interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.
Experimental research in psychology has shown that, under identifiable conditions, external
interventions affect people’s sense of self-determination, self-perception and their feeling of
justice, which in turn influences intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci and Ryan 1985). Among
psychologists, a lot of attention has been paid to the “hidden costs of reward” (see Lepper and
Greene 1978), stating that introducing a reward into a situation where people already have a
high interest in an activity results in a decrease in their intrinsic motivation (see Deci,
Koestner and Ryan 1999 for a survey). This finding has been introduced into economic theory
as the “crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation” and has been applied to many
economically relevant contexts (for surveys see Frey, 1997; Frey und Osterloh, 2001; Frey
und Jegen, 2001). The damage done to intrinsic motivation by changing external instruments
helps to explain why pricing (monetary rewards) and regulating (the use of punishment) under
identifiable conditions prove to have little or sometimes even counterproductive effects. For
example, work incentives in the form of pay for performance can undermine work morale if
they are perceived as controlling (in the sense that the workers’ voluntary efforts are not
acknowledged), and therefore often do not lead to increases in work effort. The crowding out
effect suggests that economic incentives and the price mechanism more generally should only
be used with caution if individuals have some intrinsic motivation to undertake an activity.
Identity (an individual’s self-image) can also lead to decisions that stand in conflict with
rational self-interest. A strong identity can undermine the workings of economic incentives if
people derive much utility from behaving according to their self-image. Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) show that this is relevant in many economic areas. For example, the still very unequal
distribution of the sexes in different jobs is difficult to reconcile with economically rational
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decisions of men and women. It can be explained, however, if individuals derive utility from
conforming with a (socially predetermined) gender identity. Identities are supposed to
influence economic decisions in areas like consumption, savings, education, work relations,
or donations, although there is not yet much rigorous empirical evidence on these topics.
4.3. Market Failure and Social Dilemmas
Markets generally fail in the production of public goods: if nobody can be excluded from the
consumption of a good and therefore does not have to pay a price for it, these public goods
are not or only suboptimally produced on the market, although their existence would be
desirable from a societal point of view. Because in these situations, individual and collective
rationality diverge, they are also called social dilemmas. Social dilemmas exist in a
considerable number of economic and political contexts: e.g. environmental protection, a
functioning legal system, national defence, the formation of political interest groups,
unionisation, teamwork in firms, or a functioning cartel all advance the welfare of the
respective group or even of society as a whole. But everybody can profit from these public
goods, even if he or she has not incurred costs to facilitate their production. Traditional
economics offers two solutions: the structure of the problem can be changed by defining
property rights, so that individually rational behaviour again leads to socially desirable
outcomes. This approach is often advanced, for example, in environmental economics with
the claim that environmental certificates (pollution rights) should be introduced.
Alternatively, public goods can be produced by the state (via tax financing), which is e.g. the
case in national defence or the provision of a legal system.
These solution concepts disregard, however, that they possibly start from wrong premises. As
has been shown in subsection 4.1., individuals do not always act selfishly, but are often
willing to cooperate. Social dilemmas thus can also be solved by providing an institutional
environment that enables and encourages cooperation. This is especially important for social
dilemma situations that are confined to relatively small groups of people, i.e. where
government interventions do not make much sense and it is not possible to define property
rights. Examples are common pool resources with respect to the environment and, for the
economic realm, firm specific pool resources (e.g. a firm’s reputation, accumulated firm-
specific knowledge, or core competences). Ostrom (1990, 2001) shows that common pool
resources are governed efficiently when social sanctioning mechanisms can come into play
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through the possibility of self-organisation and self-regulation. Thus, non-selfish behaviour is
often a valuable, if not necessary, precondition to overcome social dilemma situations and
mitigate the consequences of market failure. The traditional economic approach
systematically disregards such possibilities.
5. Beyond a Bounded Utility Concept: Economics and Happiness
Over the past few years, economists have become increasingly interested in happiness or
subjective well-being (surveys are given by Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b). This area has
long been the province of psychologists (see e.g. Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz 1999). It
has become clear, however, that the concept of happiness is able to offer new insights on
issues which so far have been treated lightly or been totally neglected by neoclassical
economics. First, happiness research helps to identify the determinants of individual well-
being. Happiness thus can serve as an alternative measure for welfare. A considerable number
of economists have become convinced that utility should be given content in terms of
happiness, and that it can, and should, be measured. Subjective well-being is assessed in
surveys on individuals’ happiness or life satisfaction. It is a straightforward strategy to ask
individuals directly about their well-being, and it corresponds to a good tradition in
economics: as people are supposed to be the best judges of the overall quality of their own
life, one should rely on their individual judgements. Second, happiness research offers new
possibilities of testing economic theories and discriminating between theoretical answers on
empirical phenomena. Some of the results clearly contradict the standard assumptions of
economics as used in most models, but others support the conventional economic views. By
way of example, this inspiration of economic research is discussed with respect to four
different issues: (1) Does money (in the form of higher income) buy happiness? (2) Are
people in poor countries happier than people in rich countries? (3) Do people get accustomed
to higher income? (4) How does unemployment affect happiness?
(1) Already 25 years ago, Easterlin (1974) asked the question whether higher income would
lead to higher happiness (i.e. that, corresponding to the economic view, more money would
result in more utility). Easterlin’s research received some attention, but only towards the end
of the 1990s did economists begin to conduct large-scale empirical analyses on the
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relationship between income and subjective well-being (see e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch und
Oswald, 2001). It is a stable result of all these studies that richer people are on average
happier than poorer people. But the studies also show that income does not have much effect
on happiness; other factors like health or having a job are equally or more important.
Research has also addressed the question of causality: does a higher income lead to happiness,
or do happier people simply earn more money? Using exogenous life events like winning the
lottery, it could be established that causality indeed runs from more money to more happiness.
Income, moreover, seems to have decreasing marginal utility: for low-income persons, an
improvement in the income level raises happiness substantially, while for high-income
persons, this is not the case. These results give support to traditional economic views, while
others are contradictory. For example, one reason for the limited effect of income on
happiness is that individuals evaluate their income not so much in absolute terms, but with
respect to other people (relative income hypothesis). The importance of relative income can
explain why, on average, richer people are happier in a country at a certain point in time, but
why raising average incomes do not increase the average happiness of the population over
time.
(2) Sometimes it is questioned that people living in richer countries are any happier than
people living in poor countries. A number of studies have shown, however, that this is not the
case (for example Diener et al.,1995, and Inglehart, 1990). Corresponding to conventional
economic views, welfare is positively connected with economic development. On average,
persons living in countries with a higher GDP per capita are happier than those living in poor
countries. The differences in income between the countries are thereby measured by using
exchange rates, as well as purchasing power parities, in order to control for the international
differences in the cost of living. However, there again seems to be decreasing marginal utility
of money. While in poor countries economic growth is able to raise happiness, GDP becomes
less important for more developed countries. This suggests that additional factors are
important to explain differences in reported subjective well-being between countries. The
evidence nevertheless indicates that the notion that people in poor countries are happier
because they live under more “natural” and less stressful conditions is a myth.
(3) For many countries, however, a striking and curious result has been found: whereas per
capita income has risen sharply over the last decades, average happiness has stayed constant,
or has even declined over the same period (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald 2000). In the
United States, for example, real per capita income has risen from US$ 11'000 in 1946 to US$
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27’000 in 1991, i.e. by a factor of 2.5, but average life satisfaction has fallen from 2.4 to 2.2
(on a three point scale). Obviously, people adapt to raising incomes over time. This might
have to do with the notion that relative income matters: if everyone gets richer, overall
happiness is not affected. Alternatively, people might adjust their aspirations over time.
Initially, higher income causes a rise in happiness, but then one gets used to the higher
income level and happiness adjusts downwards (for psychological theories of adaptation see
Helson, 1964, or Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999). This phenomenon suggests that
happiness is importantly influenced by the difference between aspiration levels and the things
already achieved (e.g. Inglehart, 1990, chap. 7). It also explains why most people feel less
happy in the present than they think they were in the past, but expect to become happier in the
future (Easterlin, 2001).
(4) Most economists see unemployment as an unfortunate event to be avoided as much as
possible. To become unemployed is considered to be burdensome and, above all, involuntary.
But there are also economists who hold a quite different view. Following the “new classical
macroeconomics”, unemployment is voluntary. People choose to go out of employment
because they find the burden of work and the wages paid unattractive compared to being
unemployed and getting unemployment benefits. Involuntary unemployment is a
disequilibrium phenomenon and exists only in the short run until individuals and firms have
adjusted. The issue of whether, and to what extent, the unemployed are dissatisfied is
therefore unresolved. Happiness research on unemployment is able to offer important insights
on this topic.
How particular people are affected when they become unemployed can be analysed with the
help of individual micro-level data. The studies conducted have consistently documented a
detrimental effect of unemployment on psychological well-being (see Darity and Goldsmith,
1996 for a survey from the economic perspective). Based on their study for Britain, Clark and
Oswald (1994) state that “joblessness depresses well-being more than any other single
characteristic (including important negative ones such as divorce and separation)” (p. 655).
Using panel data for Germany, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) show that the effect of
unemployment on happiness is in fact causal. It is not due to unobserved individual specific
characteristics which might affect the likelihood of becoming unemployed and happiness
simultaneously. In the same vein, all the studies control for losses in income or other indirect
effects which might depress the happiness of the unemployed. Still, they find a large, negative
‘pure’ effect of being unemployed on happiness.
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People may be unhappy about unemployment even if they are themselves not put out of work.
They may feel bad about the unfortunate fate of those unemployed, and they may also feel
repercussions on the economy and society as a whole. They may dislike the increase in
unemployment contributions and taxes likely to happen in the future, they may fear that crime
and social tension increase, and they may even see the threat of violent protests and uprisings.
A study of 12 European countries over the period 1975-1991 (Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald 2001) indeed finds that an increase in the general rate of unemployment reduces
reported life satisfaction considerably.
6. Concluding Remarks
The relationship between economics and psychology is characterised by a phase of economic
imperialism and a phase of psychological inspiration. After World War II, the development
towards the neoclassical standard model has squeezed almost all psychological content out of
economics. The resulting economic model of human behaviour has been successfully applied
to other areas outside the economy, some of them traditionally studied by psychology.
Over the last few years, economics has been inspired more and more by psychology. As
behavioural anomalies were increasingly recognised, and more attention paid to the role of
self-control problems and emotions in individual decision making, a ‘behavioural economics’
gained ground. Today, it is on the way to being accepted even by mainstream economists. It is
no longer taken for granted in economics that individuals always act as rational selfish
maximisers. It is now seen as important that people have pro-social preferences, that extrinsic
incentives may harm intrinsic motivation, that people act according to their identities, and that
non-selfish behaviour is essential for overcoming social dilemma situations. It does not seem
to be an irrational expectation to us that in the future, many other concepts and ideas will be
fruitfully borrowed from psychology in order to make economics a more inspiring science.
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